Playbook: Data Exfiltration
ID: PB-08
Severity: Critical | Category: Data Protection
MITRE ATT&CK: T1048 (Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol), T1567 (Exfiltration Over Web Service), T1041 (Exfiltration Over C2 Channel)
Trigger: DLP alert, Netflow anomaly, UEBA, Proxy/Cloud alert, EDR large file operation
Detection by Channel
graph TD
DLP["🔍 DLP Engine"] --> Ch{"📡 Channel?"}
Ch -->|Web Upload| Proxy["🌐 Proxy / CASB"]
Ch -->|Email| Mail["📧 Mail Gateway"]
Ch -->|USB| Endpoint["💻 Endpoint DLP"]
Ch -->|DNS| DNS["🔤 DNS Analytics"]
Proxy --> Alert["🚨 Alert SOC"]
Mail --> Alert
Endpoint --> Alert
DNS --> Alert
Alert --> Investigate["🔎 Investigate"]
Data Impact Assessment
sequenceDiagram
participant SOC
participant DLP
participant Legal
participant DPO
SOC->>DLP: What data was exfiltrated?
DLP-->>SOC: PII — 500 records
SOC->>Legal: 📋 Incident report
Legal->>DPO: PDPA notification required?
DPO-->>Legal: Yes — within 72 hours
Legal->>SOC: Prepare notification report
Decision Flow
graph TD
Alert["🚨 DLP / Anomaly Alert"] --> Classify{"📄 Data Classification?"}
Classify -->|L1 Public| FP["✅ Low Risk — Monitor"]
Classify -->|L2 Internal| Review["⚠️ Review Context"]
Classify -->|L3 Confidential| Urgent["🔴 Urgent Investigation"]
Classify -->|L4 Restricted/PII| Critical["🚨 Critical — Notify Legal"]
Review --> Dest{"🌐 Destination?"}
Urgent --> Dest
Critical --> Dest
Dest -->|Corporate/Approved| Context["Check Business Justification"]
Dest -->|Personal Cloud/Unknown| Block["🛑 Block + Investigate"]
Dest -->|Known Malicious| Block
Context -->|Justified| Close["Close with Documentation"]
Context -->|Unjustified| Block
Block --> Isolate["🔌 Isolate Source"]
1. Analysis (Triage)
1.1 Initial Assessment
| Check |
How |
Done |
| Data volume transferred |
DLP / Proxy logs — anomalous for this user? |
☐ |
| Destination IP/domain |
Trusted or unknown? Check reputation |
☐ |
| Data classification |
PII, financial, IP, credentials? |
☐ |
| Protocol used |
HTTP/S, FTP, DNS tunneling, USB? |
☐ |
| User context |
Normal behavior or first-time transfer? |
☐ |
1.2 Exfiltration Method Identification
| Method |
Detection Source |
MITRE ID |
| Upload to personal cloud (Google Drive, Dropbox) |
Proxy / CASB |
T1567.002 |
| Email to external address |
DLP / Email Gateway |
T1048.003 |
| USB/removable media |
DLP / Endpoint agent |
T1052.001 |
| DNS tunneling |
DNS logs (high entropy/length) |
T1048.001 |
| FTP/SCP/SFTP to external server |
Firewall / IDS |
T1048 |
| Encoded/encrypted upload |
Proxy (content inspection) |
T1048.002 |
| Cloud sync (OneDrive, iCloud) |
CASB / Endpoint |
T1567 |
| Print to PDF / screenshot |
Endpoint monitoring |
T1113 |
1.3 Scope Assessment
2. Containment
| # |
Action |
Tool |
Done |
| 1 |
Block destination IP/domain at firewall/proxy |
Firewall, Proxy |
☐ |
| 2 |
Isolate source endpoint from network |
EDR |
☐ |
| 3 |
Disable user account (if user-driven) |
AD / IdP |
☐ |
| 4 |
Revoke active sessions |
IdP |
☐ |
| 5 |
Preserve evidence — snapshot/image the source system |
Forensics |
☐ |
2.2 Additional Containment
| # |
Action |
Done |
| 1 |
Block USB/removable media on endpoint (if USB method) |
☐ |
| 2 |
Disable user's cloud sync application |
☐ |
| 3 |
Place legal hold on user's mailbox and cloud storage |
☐ |
| 4 |
Block similar transfers org-wide (if widespread) |
☐ |
3. Eradication
| # |
Action |
Done |
| 1 |
Remove any staging files (RAR/ZIP archives) from source |
☐ |
| 2 |
Scan for persistence / backdoors left by attacker |
☐ |
| 3 |
Remove any unauthorized scripts or scheduled tasks |
☐ |
| 4 |
Verify no additional exfiltration channels remain |
☐ |
4. Recovery & Legal
4.1 Damage Assessment
| Question |
Answer |
| What data was exfiltrated? |
[File list / description] |
| Classification level? |
L1 / L2 / L3 / L4 |
| Number of records (if PII)? |
|
| Business impact? |
|
| Regulatory notification required? |
PDPA (72h) / GDPR / Other |
4.2 Notification
| Stakeholder |
When |
Condition |
| SOC Lead |
Immediately |
All confirmed cases |
| Legal / Compliance |
Within 1 hour |
If L3+ data or PII involved |
| CISO |
Within 2 hours |
If L4 data or regulatory impact |
| Data Protection Officer |
Within 24 hours |
If PII of data subjects |
| Regulatory authority |
Within 72 hours |
If PDPA/GDPR breach confirmed |
| Affected individuals |
Per legal guidance |
If personal data exposed |
5. IoC Collection
| Type |
Value |
Source |
| Destination IP(s) |
|
Firewall / Proxy |
| Destination Domain(s) |
|
DNS / Proxy |
| Source Host |
|
DLP / EDR |
| Source User |
|
DLP / SIEM |
| Protocol / Port |
|
Firewall |
| File Names |
|
DLP |
| Data Volume |
|
Proxy / DLP |
| Staging Path |
|
EDR |
6. Escalation Criteria
| Condition |
Escalate To |
| L3/L4 data confirmed exfiltrated |
CISO + Legal |
| PII of > 500 individuals |
DPO + Regulatory |
| Insider threat suspected |
HR + Legal + PB-14 |
| External attacker (APT) |
Threat Intel + External IR |
| Multiple endpoints involved |
Major Incident |
| Data staging found |
Cross-reference PB-35 |
Exfiltration Channels
graph TD
Exfil["📤 Exfiltration"] --> Web["🌐 Web upload"]
Exfil --> Email["📧 Email attach"]
Exfil --> Cloud["☁️ Cloud sync"]
Exfil --> USB["💾 USB"]
Exfil --> DNS["🔤 DNS tunnel"]
Web --> DLP["🛡️ DLP inspect"]
Email --> DLP
Cloud --> DLP
USB --> EDR["🔍 EDR block"]
DNS --> NDR["📡 NDR detect"]
style Exfil fill:#e74c3c,color:#fff
style DLP fill:#27ae60,color:#fff
Data Loss Prevention Pipeline
sequenceDiagram
participant User
participant DLP
participant SOC
participant Manager
User->>DLP: Upload 500MB to Google Drive
DLP->>DLP: Scan: PII detected!
DLP-->>User: ❌ Blocked
DLP->>SOC: 🚨 Alert: PII exfiltration attempt
SOC->>Manager: Notify team lead
Detection Rules (Sigma)
References