Playbook: Wiper / Destructive Attack Response
ID: PB-38
Severity: Critical | Category: Impact
MITRE ATT&CK: T1485 (Data Destruction), T1561 (Disk Wipe), T1490 (Inhibit System Recovery)
Trigger: EDR alert (mass file deletion), SIEM (MBR overwrite pattern), multiple systems offline simultaneously
⚠️ CRITICAL: Wiper attacks are IRREVERSIBLE. Speed is everything — isolate before the wiper propagates. Do NOT attempt to remediate on infected systems.
Known Wiper Malware Families
graph TD
Wiper["💀 Wiper Malware"] --> NotPetya["NotPetya (2017)\nSMB + EternalBlue"]
Wiper --> Shamoon["Shamoon (2012)\nMBR overwrite"]
Wiper --> WhisperGate["WhisperGate (2022)\nUkraine targeted"]
Wiper --> HermeticWiper["HermeticWiper (2022)\nPartition corruption"]
Wiper --> CaddyWiper["CaddyWiper (2022)\nFile + partition wipe"]
Wiper --> Industroyer2["Industroyer2 (2022)\nOT/ICS targeted"]
Wiper --> AcidRain["AcidRain (2022)\nModem/router wipe"]
style Wiper fill:#660000,color:#fff
style NotPetya fill:#cc0000,color:#fff
style HermeticWiper fill:#cc0000,color:#fff
Wiper Kill Chain
graph LR
A["1️⃣ Access\nPhishing/Exploit"] --> B["2️⃣ Staging\nDrop wiper"]
B --> C["3️⃣ Disable Recovery\nDelete VSS/backups"]
C --> D["4️⃣ Propagation\nSMB/PsExec/GPO"]
D --> E["5️⃣ Execution\nOverwrite MBR/files"]
E --> F["6️⃣ Systems Offline\n💀"]
style A fill:#ff9900,color:#fff
style C fill:#ff4444,color:#fff
style E fill:#cc0000,color:#fff
style F fill:#660000,color:#fff
Decision Flow
graph TD
Alert["🚨 Destructive Activity Detected"] --> Type{"Type of destruction?"}
Type -->|"MBR overwrite"| MBR["Systems unbootable\n💀 CRITICAL"]
Type -->|"Mass file deletion"| Files["Mass delete/encrypt\nCheck if ransomware"]
Type -->|"Volume shadow delete"| VSS["Recovery disabled\nPrecursor to wiper"]
MBR --> Isolate["🔴 ISOLATE ALL AFFECTED SEGMENTS"]
Files --> Ransom{"Ransom note present?"}
Ransom -->|Yes| RansomPB["→ Ransomware Playbook PB-02"]
Ransom -->|"No — Pure destruction"| Isolate
VSS --> Monitor["Monitor for follow-up wiper"]
Isolate --> Scope{"Spreading?"}
Scope -->|Yes| Emergency["🚨 EMERGENCY\nSegment entire network"]
Scope -->|"Contained to single host"| Investigate["Investigate wiper binary"]
Emergency --> BCP["Activate BCP/DR"]
style Alert fill:#ff4444,color:#fff
style MBR fill:#660000,color:#fff
style Emergency fill:#660000,color:#fff
Incident Communication
sequenceDiagram
participant SOC as SOC Analyst
participant Manager as SOC Manager
participant CISO
participant CEO
participant Legal
participant BCP as BCP Team
SOC->>Manager: 🚨 Wiper detected — multiple systems down
Manager->>CISO: CRITICAL — destructive attack in progress
CISO->>CEO: BCP activation required
CISO->>Legal: Assess regulatory notification
CISO->>BCP: Activate disaster recovery
BCP->>BCP: Begin rebuild from clean backups
SOC->>Manager: Status update every 30 minutes
Manager->>CISO: Scope assessment: X systems affected
Wiper Propagation Methods
graph TD
Prop["Propagation Methods"] --> SMB["SMB/EternalBlue\nNetwork shares"]
Prop --> PsExec["PsExec/WMI\nAdmin credentials"]
Prop --> GPO["Group Policy\nDomain-wide deployment"]
Prop --> Supply["Supply Chain\nSoftware update mechanism"]
Prop --> USB["USB/Removable\nAir-gapped networks"]
SMB --> Wide["🔴 Network-wide impact"]
PsExec --> Wide
GPO --> Wide
style Prop fill:#333,color:#fff
style Wide fill:#660000,color:#fff
Response Timeline
gantt
title Wiper Attack Response Timeline
dateFormat HH:mm
axisFormat %H:%M
section Detection
Alert triggered :a1, 00:00, 5min
Confirm destructive :a2, after a1, 10min
section Containment
Network segmentation :a3, after a2, 15min
Isolate all affected :a4, after a3, 30min
section Recovery
Assess backup status :a5, after a4, 60min
Begin rebuild :a6, after a5, 180min
System restoration :a7, after a6, 480min
section Hardening
Root cause analysis :a8, after a7, 120min
Impact Severity Matrix
graph TD
Impact["Impact Assessment"] --> Single{"Single host?"}
Single -->|Yes| Low["🟡 Medium\nRebuild single system"]
Single -->|Multiple| Domain{"Domain controller affected?"}
Domain -->|No| Med["🟠 High\nMultiple system rebuild"]
Domain -->|Yes| DC{"AD database intact?"}
DC -->|Yes| High["🔴 Critical\nDC rebuild + credential reset"]
DC -->|No| Cat["💀 Catastrophic\nFull AD rebuild from backup"]
style Impact fill:#333,color:#fff
style Cat fill:#660000,color:#fff
| # |
Action |
Owner |
| 1 |
ISOLATE affected network segments immediately |
Network Team |
| 2 |
Power OFF systems showing wiper activity (preserve evidence) |
SOC T1 |
| 3 |
Block lateral movement: disable SMB, PsExec, WMI |
Network Team |
| 4 |
Verify backup integrity BEFORE connecting backup systems |
SOC T2 |
| 5 |
Alert CISO — activate BCP/DR plan |
SOC Manager |
| 6 |
Preserve at least ONE infected system for forensics |
IR Team |
2. Investigation Checklist
Malware Analysis
Scope Assessment
Initial Access
3. Containment
| Priority |
Action |
Details |
| P0 |
Network segmentation |
Block all SMB (445), RDP (3389) between VLANs |
| P0 |
Disable admin shares |
net share C$ /delete across network |
| P1 |
Disconnect backups |
Ensure backup networks are air-gapped |
| P1 |
Disable scheduled tasks |
Remove GPO-deployed tasks |
| P2 |
Block C2 domains/IPs |
Firewall + DNS sinkhole |
4. Eradication & Recovery
Recovery Priority
- Domain Controllers — Rebuild AD from clean backup
- DNS/DHCP — Restore network services
- Backup infrastructure — Verify and protect
- Critical business systems — ERP, email, file servers
- Workstations — Reimage from gold image
Recovery Checklist
5. Post-Incident
Lessons Learned
| Question |
Answer |
| Was the wiper detected before execution? |
[Timeline] |
| Were backups properly air-gapped? |
[Yes/No] |
| How fast was network segmentation? |
[Time] |
| Was BCP/DR plan effective? |
[Assessment] |
Recovery Metrics
| Metric |
Target |
Actual |
| Time to detect |
< 15 min |
[Actual] |
| Time to contain |
< 30 min |
[Actual] |
| Systems affected |
0 |
[Count] |
| Data permanently lost |
0 |
[Assessment] |
| Time to full recovery |
< 72h |
[Actual] |
6. Detection Rules (Sigma)
title: Volume Shadow Copy Deletion (Wiper Precursor)
logsource:
product: windows
category: process_creation
detection:
selection:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'vssadmin delete shadows'
- 'wmic shadowcopy delete'
- 'bcdedit /set.*recoveryenabled.*no'
- 'wbadmin delete catalog'
condition: selection
level: critical
title: Mass File Deletion Pattern
logsource:
product: windows
category: file_delete
detection:
selection:
TargetFilename|endswith:
- '.doc'
- '.xls'
- '.pdf'
- '.mdb'
timeframe: 1m
condition: selection | count() > 100
level: critical
References